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Land Tenure, Access to Land and Agricultural Development in Ugand a 
Africanist scholars and African governme nts are caught in a land policy 
~ 
dilemma. Both neoclassical economic theory and Marxist theory assert that 
inc r e ased concentration of landholding is a precondition to development 
(Berry, 1988). Neoclassical economic theory demonstrates that, in a market 
economy, individuals who can use land more productively will bid land away 
from those whose uses are less valuable . l / Increased production results from 
both increased productivity per acre from the change to users with hi gher 
managerial skill, and from possible economies of scale in production 
processes. Likewise, Marxist theory asserts that increased concentration of 
landholding is central to the formation of the capitalist class, through 
exploitation of displaced labor and i.ncreased use of capital in production 
(Berry, 1988). 
Yet increasingly unequal distribution of landholding in agriculture 
withoat economic expansion in the non-farm sector means high unemployment, 
increasingly unequal income distribution, limited internal markets, slower 
economic growth and perhaps political instability. In the absence of 
economic growth in the non-agricultural sector, labor displaced from 
agriculture has no alt.ernative source of employment. Many academics have 
raised the spectra of a large, unemployed, pauperized landless class i n rural 
areas (Fleuret, 1988, p. 154; Bruce, 1988, p. 44). 
The dilemma for policy is how to increase agricultural productivity and 
total output without also creating a landless class. It is this dilemma for 
policy that is examined in this paper: Can those farmers who can use land 
most productively gain access to land at the same time that the poor are 
guaranteed access to enough land to earn at least a subsistence income? 
•• 
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Tne land tenure system determines how easily farmers can">Obtain access 
to land to expand their operations and the degree to which the .. poor have 
access to land for subsistence produi:;tion. Land tenure rules define the 
rights and duties of individuals with respect to each other in their use of 
prop2r=y, the rules of access to land and the nature of specific rights such 
as use, transfer, inheritance, rental, or use as credit collat~ral. Tenure 
rules also determine the conditions under which individuals have no-right to 
land . In a market system no-right is the result of limited bi dding powe r 
because of limited net worth or equity, credit access and/or ab i l ity to 
generate cash income from land. 
In customary African systems, no-right was rare because customary 
systems generally guaranteed access to land through membership in a social, 
usually kinship, group (Bruce, 1988). Customary tenure rules were well 
adapted to conditions of plentiful land and scarce labor, guaranteeing that 
the scarce factor of production (labor) had access to as mc:ch complementary 
input ( land) as needed. Farmers able to use more land, e.g. those w~th 
larger households or better farm management skills, had access to more land 
yet those with few resources were also guaranteed access to land and 
therefore at least a subsistence income. 
Tnese tenure rules may perform less well under conditions of plentiful 
labor but scarce land.Z/ On the one hand, those farmers ab le to use land 
most productively may be denied access to more than is needed for subsistence 
income . On the other hand, the rules guaranteeing land access to the poorest 
households may weaken or be impossible to enforce as land becomes more 
scarce. 
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Under conditions of increasing land scarcity due to commercialization of 
agriculture and increasing population density, tenure rules evolved to 
increase individual rights at the ex.pense of group rights in many African 
settings (Barrows and Roth) . In many customary tenure systems, the holder of 
use rights in land did not hold exchange rights, or the exchange rights were 
circumscribed by conditions on the rules of transfer (e.g. pledging or 
loaning land) or the group within which use rights could be exchanged (e.g. 
within a clan). Typically, as customary systems become more individualized 
group control over the distribution of land among community members weakens. 
As individual rights in land expand, the effect on agricultural development 
and income distribution depends on who obtains access to land and who is 
exclud2d. In effect, tenure rules define who will capture the gains from 
technological change that increases per acre productivity, or the gains that 
accrue to holders of land as population growth increases the de~and for food 
and other land products. 
Thus, tenure rules are central to the land policy dilemma facing Afri-an 
governments. Land tenure rules define how individuals obtain access to land 
and are therefore central to the emergence of a commercial farming class. 
The same tenure rule,s also determine the extent to which the poor have access 
to land or are guaranteed the minimum land area necessary for survival. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the dilemma of African land 
policy in the context of two quite different land tenure systems in Buganda 
(see Map 1). The two land tenure systems exist in close proximity: the mailo 
system that provides individual title and registration, and a customary 
system based on descent group membership. The question is how these systems 
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perform in allowing progressive farmers access to more land and providing the 
poor enough land to earn a subsistence income. 
CUSTOMARY AND MAILO TENURE 
Customary Land Tenure 
Prior to 1900, land tenure rules in Buganda gave individuals rights to 
land through either descent group membership , political position, or both. 
Usufruct was allocated by both clan heads and by chiefs who were appointe d by 
the Kabaka 0king) and could be removed or transferred at will (West, ~96 5 ). 
In the far distant past, the groups that eventually made up the Kingdom of 
Buganda apparently had land tenure systems in which land was controlled by 
clans and use rights allocated by descent group membership (Mukwaya, 1953). 
The rise of the hierarchical political Kingdom of Buganda superimposed a 
second set of land tenure rules. The Kabaka granted control over land to 
chiefs at several levels of the political hierarchy who could allocate 
usufruct and demand tribute in labor or produce from peasants. West (1972 ) 
notes that by the 1870's: "Political allegiance and clientship already 
carried as much weight as kinship ties; lineages had ceased to have much 
rerritorial or residential significance, for neither clans nor their 
constituent lineages lived together as groups" (p. 11). 
Clan rights (obutaka) were vested in heads of clans and sub-clans who 
could reside on the land, use it themselves, allocate usufruct to others, a n d 
upon the head's death the rights were vested in the successor clan head . 
Individual peasants were allocated use of clan land, but kinship in Baganda 
land tenure was much less important than among other ethnic groups. 
Discussing clan lands, Mukwaya notes that "In no case does a claim cover one 
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continuous territory or a big number of contiguous villages" (1953, p. 8) and 
in most clan-controlled villages clansmen were in the minority. Natural 
population growth in the presence of:. other nearby clans served to fragment 
some of the clan lands. But more important was the hierarchical political 
system in which chiefs were frequently transferred from one part of the 
kingdom to another, often taking some of their kinsmen along in their rise in 
the political structure. 
The Kabaka appointed the chiefs and assigned the land over which the 
chief might exercise administrative control. Rights granted chiefs were not 
inheritable so upon the chief's death both the office and the land reverted 
to the Kabaka for reassignment (West, 1965, p. 4). The political system was 
intensely competitive, and advantage accrued to those with large numbers of 
peasants under their jurisdiction. Yet peasants could move freely and 
frequently did so to better their condition. The result was competition 
among political leaders for peasant support: "Even the village headman tried 
to attract peasants to his community by giving them land to cultivate, for 
this was to his own benefit and that of his lord" (Richards, p . 5 7). Land 
was an instrument to attain social status and advance one's political career. 
The individual peasant typically obtained land to farm (kibanja) through 
the political mechanism , if he lived in a village controlled by a political 
chi~f. but could also obtain land through clan membership if he lived in one 
of the villages controlled by clans. In either case, usufructuary rights 
were inheritable but not negotiable. The peasant was obligated to provide 
the clan head or chief with labor for roads or public works, military 
service, and chiefs were also due a payment in kind called "envujjo" (west, 
1972, p. 13). A few individuals, usually high political officials, obtained 
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rights to small family-sized plots through a special type of land tenure 
(obwesengeze) that was based on a specific grant from the Kabaka (Mukwaya, 
1953, p. 12) . These rights were inheritable and carried with them no 
political duties, setting the stage for the more individualized mailo system . 
Finally, even the concept of selling rights in land was not unknown, 
evidenced by a few sales made by the Kabaka in the late 1890's (West, 1972, 
pp . 131-33) . 
The period prior to the introduction of mailo tenure was particularly 
chaotic. Between 1884 and 1900 there were four Kabakas , three civil wars and 
other disturbances (Mukwaya, 1953, p. 5) . With each change, chiefs were 
removed or transferred and high political officials replaced, resulting in 
considerable movement of peasants who were following political leaders . The 
civil wars, in which various religious groups were driven into or out of 
different areas, also resulted in massive shifts of population. These 
disruptions further weakened the traditional system of clan rights in land. 
Mailo Tenure 
The Buganda Agreement of 1900 dealt largely with political and military 
issues but Article 15 fundamentally changed Baganda land tenure by creating a 
form of freehold tenµre for political notables (West , 1972) . Land was 
allocated in square mile blocks (hence the term mailo) . A small amount (573 
square miles) was given to the Kabaka and high officials (termed "official 
mailo"), 8,430 square miles were given to other political officials (termed 
"private mailo"), and less than 300 square miles were allocated in freehold 
to churches, the central government and non-Africans. 
Over 4000 individuals received private mailo. Mailo could be bought and 
sold , inherited, given to others, but could not be alienated to non-Baganda. 
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The rights of peasants who occupied the land were not discussed in the 
agreements, but in general peasants continued to farm the lands as before. 
These cultivators became known as "m~ilo tenants" although the relationship 
between the mailo owner and mailo tenant was more political than economic, 
essentially a continuation of the pre-1900 relationship between chief and 
subject with respect to land. 
Gradually the economic value of land became apparent to the mailo 
owners. The tribute of labor and goods due the overlord under the 
traditional system was gradually transformed into economic rent, to such a 
degree that in 1928 the Busuulu and Envuujo Law was enacted to protect 
tenants and fix absolute rents. As in the pre-1900 tenure system, tenants 
could not sell their land rights but the tenancy was inheritable. Legally, 
t:enants could not be evicted unless: (1) the tenant:: abandoned the land; or 
(2) the mailo owner sold the land and the new owner could demonstrate he 
needed the land for his own agricultural use and no alternative land were 
available. 
Security of tenure was very high for both owners and tenants on mailo 
land, although" ... nevertheless a man felt more secure if he owns his 
~and .... " (Mukwaya, ~953). The establishment of virtual freehold rights on 
mailo land did not induce landowners to immediately make land investments. 
Richards (1973) notes that "The mailo system itself ... did not result in the 
commercial use of land by its owners for a period of some 40 to 50 years .... " 
(p. 297). Mukwaya (1953) noted that protection of tenant rights prevented 
owners from aggregating enough land to invest in machinery and capture 
economies of scale, yet prevented tenants from mortgaging land for credit for 
farm investment. West (1972) argued that laws that provided tenant security 
. 
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denied land access to investor-purchasers with capital to invest, and t:hat 
" . . . the mailo owner may regard his tenanted land more as a source of capital 
for other projects than as a field for investment in itself" (p. 85). 
The mailo system in Uganda led to the emergence of a market in land. 
The original 4,000 mailo owners and parcels had increased to about 112,000 
and 160,000 parcels by 1967 (West, 1972, p . 196), and much of the 
increase has been attributed to sales to former tenants. The market was also 
historically important in the emergence of a class of commercial farmer s. 
Mukwaya (1953) found that 85 percent of landholders surveyed in Busiro and 
Budda counties had purchased their land, accounting for 24 percent of the 
land area in the sample . Reasons for sale of land included raising capital 
for business ventures, house construction, automobile purchase and payment o:E 
school fees. Most buyers were not farm operators, but purchased land for 
investment end for social and political advantages. "The ma5-n reason why 
people bought land was to get the social and political advantages associated 
with landowning ... Here and there a man buys land to develop himself but the 
majority buy with the intention of becoming landlords" (pp. 36-37). Writing 
in 1973, Hougham noted that "In Buganda today one may discern strong social 
raotivations behind the possession of land, despite 60 years during which it 
has been a saleable commodity and almost 50 years during which it has been 
utilized for cash crop production" (p. 125). 
Yet the market in mailo has historically allowed land to be transferred 
to those with high-valued uses, as neoclassical economic theory would 
predict . A survey by Hougham (1973) showed that most commercial farmers 
acquired their land through purchase, usually with capital accumulated 
through nonfarm work or sale of cash crops . Fortt (1973) noted that many 
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tenants purchased land during 1930-1960, and that these land purchasers 
" ... were eager to acquire the social and political advantages of landowning, 
and in this respect could be considered 'men of affairs' but they were also 
compelled, by the small size of their holdings, to grow cash crops in order 
to fulfil their monetary needs , and so were necessarily 'men of property' who 
had to pay attention to the economic value of their land" (p. 76). In the 
1960's the market enabled highly educated Buganda in the commercial or 
governmental sector to spend their savings on land, leading to a new group of 
commercial farmers with technical knowledge, willingness to try new 
practices, and ability to extract assistance from government or commercial 
banking bureaucracies (Fortt, p. 84). Clearly, factors other than mailo 
tenure were ~ritical in the emergence of commercial farming, such as 
favorable commodity prices and nonagricultural economic growt:t that provided 
capital for investment in commercial farming (Fortt, p. 84). 
Public Land 
Only about one-half the land in Buganda was included in the mailo 
system. Although on average the political notables selected land for the 
mailo system in the parts of Buganda with more favorable soils and rainfall, 
in many areas mailo land was interspersed with land that remained under 
customary tenure. The system of customary tenure evolved from the political 
and clan systems into a system of customary rights that are more 
individualized over generations of inheritances. A land market in customary 
holdings is well developed in some areas. 
In 1969 the Public Lands Act reconfirmed customary rights in land, 
administered by traditional authorities. The Act provided that a holder of 
customary rights could apply to the Land Commission for a grant of leasehold, 
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but very few such leases were ever granted. More important, the Act 
protected the customary rights held by an individual by forbidding the 
granting of any lease to any other party if any part of the land were held 
under customary tenure. The Ac t abolished official mailo but left private 
mailo unchanged. 
Land Reform Decree of 1975 
In 1975, government issued the Land Reform Decree of 1975 (LRD), vesting 
title to all land in government, to be held in trust for the people. The 
Decree abolished all forms of mailo and freehold, transforming mailo owners 
into leasees of the state and mailo tenants into sub-leasees. More 
specifically, the mailo tenant became a sub-leasee-at-sufferance with respect 
to the former mailo owner, meaning that tenants became subject to involuntary 
eviction. The protection given customary holders by the Public Land Act was 
abolished, customary holde rs became leasees, and the Land Commission was 
given the authority to evict customary holders without their consent. Even 
more fundamental, customary holders were held to be "at sufferance" that is 
persons occupying the land without the express consent of the landowner 
(government). Mailo tenants and customary holders were guaranteed 
compensation if evic"ted, but both the eviction and compensation procedures 
proved open to abuse. Thus, the Decree abolished protection for mailo 
owners, mailo tenants and customary holders . 
The Decree was not widely implemented due to political and military 
unrest and mailo owners, tenants, and customary holders continued to use land 
under much the same rules as applied prior to 1975. The only practical 
difference uncovered in this research was that, because the Decree abolished 
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envujjo and busuulu along with mailo, the former mailo tenants make no 
payment to the former mailo owners. 
In this research the terms mailo owner, mailo tenant, and customary 
holder will be used even though legally such terms no longer have me~ning. 
Similarly, the term "public land" will be used to denote land that wa·s under 
customary tenure prior to the Land Reform Decree, and "mailo land" w:bll o e 
used to denote the land occupied by mailo owners or tenants. The term "mailo 
owner parcel" denotes mailo land farmed by the owner; "mailo tenancy l a·;·0 ·: " 
denotes mailo land farmed by a mailo tenant . 
METHODOLOGY 
Buganda is ideally suited to explore the relationship between the ~ ules 
of land tenure, dev·3lopment of commercial farming and the emergence of a. 
landless class . .Mailo ownership is akin to freehold tenure, customary t enure 
is similar to the evolved tenure systems in many other African nations and 
mailo tenancy is a unique tenure form that provides high levels of security 
and low or zero rent but does not confer freehold rights in land. The 
questions addressed by survey research in the mailo areas of Uganda were : 
~l) Under which tenure system are progressive farmers best able to acquire 
access to land to expand their farm operations? (2) Are the poor guaranteed 
access to enough land to earn a subsistence income? 
The hypotheses were: (1) land i.n mailo ownership with no tenants snould 
provide the most attractive and available option for farmers with high 
managerial ability seeking to gain access to land; land under customary 
tenure should be least likely to be available to the more progressive 
farmers; (2) the poor should have most access to land under customary 
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tenure, although mailo tenancy land may also provide the poor access _thr ough 
'-~ 
inheritance; the poor are least likely to have access to mailo land with n o 
tenancy encumbrances. The empirical:· results proved surprising. 
A sample survey was carried out in Oc tober-December, 1988 at two 
research sites selected such that at each site: (1) mailo land is adjacent to 
public land under customary tenure; (2) mailo land is farmed by both owners 
and tenants; (3) the land records office had enough intact records to 
identify mailo and customary holdings and obtain a list of rights-holde :c c; 
(regardless how dated the listing). 
The two sites selected are typical of the southern and northern mailo 
regions: (1) the adjacent sub-counties of Zirobwe (mailo) and Bamunanika 
(public land) in Luwero District about 60 kilometers north of Kampala; and 
(2) the sub-counties of Ki.binge (mailo) and Butenga (public lar.d) i.n Masaka 
District about 140 kilometers southwest of Kampala. (Prior to 1969 some of 
the public land at the Luwero site had been official mailo). Within each 
research site sample mailo blocks (land survey units) were selected at 
random, Block 60 in Zirobwe and Block 277 in Kibinge. Within each block 
parcels were selected at random. Interviews were conducted with individuals 
owning or holding tenancies within those parcels. The process of sampling 
and interviewing was continued until at least 35 usable observations had been 
collected for each of the three tenure t ypes at each site. Thus, the 
original sampling unit is a parcel and the interview was conducted with the 
individual who is using the land--a mailo owner farming land he owns, a mailo 
tenant farming land under rnailo tenancy, or a customary holder farming public 
land. These individuals and their households may farm other parcels under 
other tenure arrangements. Absentee mailo owners are not included in the 
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sample; a parcel owned by an absentee mailo owner would be represented i n the 
sample as a mailo tenancy parcel . However, not all mailo tenancy parcels are 
owned by absentee mailo owners. Lo c'al leaders at both sites were interviewed 
to obtain information and insights not easily obtained in a sample survey, 
such as cases of evictions or behavior of lending institutions. 
In the analysis some hypotheses are tested by treating each parcel as a 
separate observation, others using household-level data combining several 
parcels a household might farm. It is valid to treat each parcel as a 
separate observation, because owners treat parcels under different tenure 
differently. For example, about one-half the households with parcels under 
different tenure types reported different levels of tenure security among the 
parcels, suggesting that farmers do distinguish among tenure types for 
parcels they farm. In the analysis it will be indicated whether parcel or 
household-level data are used. 
RESULTS 
General Overview of Sample Data 
The survey included 114 households in Luwero District and 107 in Masaka 
~istrict. In almost all cases the interview was conducted with the head of 
the household (104 in Luwero, 95 in Masaka). Most of the household heads 
were male (96 of 114 in Luwero, 97 of 107 in Masaka). The average age of the 
household head was 54 . 75 years in Luwero and 53.82 years in Masaka. 
Household size was slightly larger in Masaka, averaging 10.0 persons versus 
8.5 persons in Luwero . The leve l of education of household heads was 
similar, averaging 5.4 years in Luwero and 4 . 7 years in Masaka. 
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A very large majority of household heads were employed most of the time 
on the farm: 81 of 114 (71 percent) in Luwero and 93 of 107 (87 percent) in 
Masaka. Off-farm income was scattered among several occupations , with 
government worker and trader/shopkeepers the most prevalent in Luwero (9 
cases each) <.ind government worker in Masaka (6 cases). Most households also 
had other adults (e.g. respondent's wife) spending most of their time working 
on the farm (103 of 114 households in Luwero, 85 of 107 households in 
Masaka). 
Agricultural activities were the main source of cash income . Of 114 
households in Luwero, 102 reported cash income from coffee and 67 indicated 
coffee as their most important cash income source; 51 reported cash income 
from sale of other crops and 24 households indicated that this was their most 
important source of cash income. Of 107 households in Masaka, 90 reported 
cash income from coffee and 76 indicated coffee as their most important cash 
income source; 78 reported cash income from other crops and 16 households 
indicated this was their most important source of cash income. Thus, sale of 
agricultural products was the most important source of cash income for most 
of the households in the sample: 91 of 114 households (79 . 8 percent) in 
buwero and 92 of 107 · households (86.0 percent) in Masaka. 
In Luwero the 114 households had 83 parcels under mailo ownership, 44 
parcels under mailo tenancy and 55 parcels under customary tenancy. In Masaka 
the 107 households had 53 parcels under mailo ownership, 51 parcels under 
mailo tenancy and 40 parcels under customary tenancy on public lands. In 
Luwero, 59 households had multiple parcels and 23 households had parcels 
under more than one type of tenure. In Masaka, 25 households had multiple 
parcels and 10 households had parcels under more than one type of tenure . 
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Table 1 
General Characteristics of Sample 
(household data unless noted) 
Luwero 
Number surveyed 
Household heads interviewed 
Household head male 
Average age of head (years) 
Average household size (persons) 
Average number of adults 
Average years education (head) 
Head works mostly on farm 
Other adults work mostly on farm 
Coffee most important cash income 
Other crops most important cash income 
Total number of parcels 
Mailo ownership (parcels) 
Mailo tenancy (parcels) 
Customary tenure (parcels) 
Households with multiple parcels 
Households with multiple tenures 
Average parcel size (acres) 
Most important crop: 
banana (parcels) 
coffee (parcels) 
Second most important crop: 
beans (parcels) 
coffee (parcels) 
Cattle-owning households 
Average number of cattle owned 
114 
104 
96 
54.75 
8.5 
4. 3 
5.4 
81 
103 
67 
24 
182 
83 
44 
55 
57 
23 
11. 04 
88 
60 
24 
74 
41 
1. 56 
Mas aka 
107 
95 
97 
53.82 
10.0 
4. 7 
.7 
93 
85 
76 
16 
144 
53 
51 
40 
27 
10 
9.89 
113 
7 
26 
90 
18 
1. 50 
Average parcel size was similar in the two areas: 11.04 acres in Luwero 
and 9.89 acres in Masaka. The range in parcel size was quite large, from 0.8 
acres to 170 acres in Luwero and from 0.5 to 64 acres in Masaka, excluding 
one Masaka mailo owner with a 300 acre parcel. Most of the larger parcels 
were in mailo ownership and are most likely remanent of the larger mailo 
blocks allocated at the beginning of the century (see Mukaywa for examples). 
For example, in Luwero all parcels under mailo tenancy were less than 20 
acres and only two parcels under customary tenure were above 20 acres. In 
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contrast, 20.9 percent of all parcels under mailo ownership (15 of 72 
parcels) were over 20 acres. In Masaka, all parcels under customary tenancy 
were under 7. 5 acres, only 4 parcels;, in mailo tenancy (of 51 total) were 
larger than 10 acres, while 54.7 percent of all parcels in mailo ownership 
(29 of 53 parcels) were over 10 acres. 
Crops grown in the two areas are also very similar. In Luwero, the most 
important crop was banana on 88 parcels and coffee on 60 parcels. Coffee was 
the second most important crop on 74 parcels in Luwero. In Masaka banana was 
the most important crop on 113 of the 144 parcels and coffee was most 
important on only 7 parcels. However, coffee was the second most important 
crop on 90 parcels. In Luwero 41 of the 114 households owned cattle, 
compared to only 18 of 107 households in Masaka. In general, farming 
patterns are similar in the two research areas, but Masaka is relatively more 
specialized in banana and Luwero in coffee. 
In both Luwero and Masaka average parcel size is higher for parcels 
farmed by mailo owners than those farmed by mailo tenants or customary 
holders and the differences are statistically significant (See Table 2). 3 
Although mailo ownership parcels are larger, average coffee acreage per 
parcel does not different by tenure type. The result is that the proportior. 
of land planted to coffee is lower for parcels under mailo ownership than 
under either mailo tenancy or customary tenancy. This difference may be 
accounted for by the fact that the number of adults available for farm labor 
is not greatly different among households under different tenure types. If 
labor constrains coffee cultivation then larger parcels under mailo ownersh i? 
would not ,be associated with larger acreage planted to coffee. 
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Table 2 
Land Use by Tenure Type: Luwero and Masaka 
(pa:r:cel data) 
Number of parcels 
Luwero 
Mas aka 
Average size of parcel (acres) 
Luwero 
Mas aka 
Coffee acreage, average/parcel 
Luwero 
Mas aka 
Average coffee yields (bags/acre) 
Luwero 
Mas aka 
Percent of land in coffee 
Luwero 
Mas aka 
Mailo 
Owner 
83 
53 
17.95 
19.25 
1. 08 
3.56 
6.45 
8 . 37 
12 
24 
Mailo 
Tenancy 
44 
51 
5.29 
6.11 
1. 05 
2.10 
5.48 
6.90 
22 
27 
Customary 
Te nu-re 
53 
40 
6.04 * 
2.54 * 
1. 06 
.89 
* 
6.32 
5.87 
24 * 
31 
*Differences among tenure types significant at the ~ 10 level . 
Progressive Farmers Access to Land 
Applying neoclassical economic theory to the process of agricultural 
economic development presents a fundamental problem of identifying those 
farmers (or farm households) able to use land most productively. In an 
exhaustive study with ample time, financial and human resources, it is 
possible to estimate marginal productivity of land for each farming 
household. But such a study is beyond the means of this, and most, research 
projects . An alternative is to use proxy variables to identify those who are 
likely to be able to use land most productively. 
In this study, "progressive" farmers were identified using an index 
based on farming practices which : (1) are recommended by agricultural 
research and extension officials; and (2) require a minimum of capital or 
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labor to adopt. The term "innovators" might be more accurate in describing 
this group, or the more neutral term "adopters," because group membership is 
determined based on adoption of re2ornrnended farming practices .l/ The 
practices selected to identify "progressive'' farmers were: pruning coffee 
with a saw, spraying crops for insects, using mulch or fertilizer and spacing 
crops. Pruning coffee with a small pruning saw instead of a machete or 
knife, spacing crops and using mulch require little or no labor or capital 
beyond the alternative practices. Spraying for insect control does not 
necessarily require purchase of a sprayer, but both spraying and use of 
fertilizer do require modest expenditures early in the cropping year. The 
index of "progressivity" may therefore be slightly biased toward households 
with higher income that allows early-season purchase of inputs, but such bias 
is likely to be quite small. The index is similar to that developed by 
Bowden and Moris (1969) in their study of progressive Baganda farmers. 
Table 3 
Components of Progressive Index: 
Number and Percent of Responden~s 
(household data) 
Practice Luwero Mas aka 
Prune coffee with a saw 
Spray crops for insects 
Use mulch 
Use fertilizer 
Space crops 
Number 
68 
30 
15 
18 
80 
Percent 
55 
27 
14 
16 
75 
Number Percent 
4 4 
39 38 
39 38 
17 16 
22 21 
Note: observations with missing data not counted in percentages 
J 
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Each respondent indicated whether he/she used each of these practicfts. For 
each question, a "yes" response was assigned the value one, a "no• •,c~sponse a 
value zero. The "progressive index•c is simply the sum of the responses to 
these questions on progressive farming practices, i.e. is equal to the number 
of "yes" responses to these questions on recommended farming practices. The 
progressi-..;e index can assume a value of zero to five. The index mean in 
Luwero is 2.79 and the ~ean in Masaka is 1.91. For some analysis it was 
useful to group respondents into two groups. Those with a progressivity 
index less than or equal to two were termed "not progressive" and those with 
an index value three or greater were termed "progressive." 
Progressivitv Index and Tenure. Most farmers in both the progressive 
and not-progressive c~tegories received their major cash income from 
agriculture and there is no difference between the groups with respect to 
source of income. Progressive farmer$ have more acreage (Masaka only), more 
acres in coffee (Luwero only), a larger percentage of their land in coffee 
(Luwero only) , and higher coffee yields (Masaka only) . Ages of both groups 
are about the same. The progressive farmers can be characterized differently 
in Masaka and Luwero. In Masaka, compared to not-progressive farmers, 
progressive farmers .have twice as much land, more parcels, are looking for 
land to e::>:?and their farms, and are "better" farmers in terms of coffee 
yields. In Luwero, progressive farmers have about the same amount of land as 
others but have acquired more parcels, are looking for more land to expand 
their operations, and seem to be more commercially-oriented with higher 
proportions of their land, and more acres, in coffee. 
Table 4 
Characteristic 
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Characteristics of Progressive Farmers 
(household data) 
Luwero Mas aka 
Prog. Not Prog. Prog. Not Prog. 
Number of householdsa 
Age 
Percen_t whose main 
source of income 
is agriculture 
Average acres of coffee 
Proportion of land 
in coffee 
Average coffee yield 
(bags per acre) 
Acres held 
No. parcels held 
Percent looking for 
more land 
Average ease of land 
access (l=easy S=hard) 
30 
52 
78.3 
1. 3 
.24 
5.5 
11.4 
2.5 
76 
3.07 
70 
56 * 
79.7 
0.8 * 
.13 * 
6.5 
10.0 
2.1 * 
50 * 
2. 91 
18 
54 
85.0 
2.80 
. 34 
9.6 
14.5 
2.7 
74 
2.89 
78 
54 
91. 6 
2.18 
.30 
6. 7 -:!:' 
7.7 * 
1.5 * 
43 '~ 
3.00 
a Indexes could not be constructed for 14 households in Luwero and 11 in 
Masaka due to missing values for one or more of the variables in the index . 
Access to Land. The data provide seemingly conflicting evidence on how 
tenure rules function to allow access to progressive farmers. At both sites, 
progressive farmers have more parcels than others, suggesting that, at least 
in the past, they have access to land to begin or expand their farm 
Operations. Progressive farmers also have more acreage at both sites 
although the difference is statistically significant at the .10 level only in 
Masaka. Yet progressive farmers are more likely than others to be looking 
for more land to farm. The seeming inconsistency can be easily reconciled ,·by 
nothing that in any cross-sectional analysis it is likely that those farmers 
labeled "progressive" are more likely to be looking for land than others. 
Progressive farmers find it as hard to acquire land as other farmers, 
according to responses to questions on the degree of difficulty in gaining 
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access to land for farming. In both a Chi-square test and a t-test on 
difference in group means, there was no statistically significant difference 
in ease of acquiring land between progressive farmers and others in both 
Luwero and Masaka . Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that progressive 
farmers are able to gain access to land. 
,;/' The key question for land policy is how these farmers gain access to 
land, and what type of tenure proves most flexible in adapting to the needs 
of these farmers. In Luwero, parcels held by customary holders were 
associated with the highest progressivity index; parcels held by mailo owners 
had the lowest index value. In Masaka mailo owners had the highest 
progressivity index and customary holders had the lowest index (see Table 5). 
In both cases differences in index means were statistically significant at 
the .10 level. In other words, in Hasaka a progressive farmer is most likely 
to be found on land he owns under mailo tenure, but in Luwero the progressive 
farmer is most likely found on land under customary tenure and least likely 
to be a rnailo owner. The Masaka results support the main hypothesis; the 
Luwero results are exactly the opposite. 
Location 
Luwero 
.Mas aka 
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Table 5 
Mean Progressivity Index by Tenure Type 
(par.eel data) 
Mailo 
Owner 
2.57 
3.16 
Mailo 
Tenancv 
2.60 
2.61 
Customary 
Tenure 
3 . 61 * 
1.16 * 
*Differences statistically significant at the . 10 level. 
The paradoxical results have several possible explanations. First, ease 
of acquisition of land in a particular tenure may vary by location. If 
progressive farmers have no inherent preference for a particular tenure type, 
the results may simply reflect differences between Masaka and Luwero in 
availability of land under different tenures. Second, the results may 
reflect historic land allocation patterns. It is possible that more 
progressive farmers acquired most of their land through inheritance or gift, 
and that farm management skills differ because of historic differences in the 
groups farming land under different tenure in the different locations. Data 
on how land was acquired may help distinguish between these two possible 
explanations. 
Importantly, in both Luwero and .Masaka, progressive farmers tend to 
'1'"'. - ~~--· ... ~ 
acquire land through purchase. Using pare~.,.-;:: \~~;.d-a-~a.· ; ·:~~~<e ~verage index of 
/, Y.r~"· ~ - - . 
progressivity can be constructed for pa ~~.r'~cquired through i .nheritance or 
~ I . . . !\l: . . ' 
gift versus those acquired through pure s ~ , (see. Table 6). Land that was 
, ' ·- . 
acquired through purchase tends to be held.''by : ~ore progressive farmers, on 
average, than land acquired through inheritance or gift . 
-J 
Means of Acquisition 
LUWERO 
Purchase 
Inherit or Gift 
MA SAKA 
Purchase 
Inherit or Gift 
23 
Table 6 
Average Progressivity Index, 
by Means Pa~cel Was Acquired 
(parcel data) 
Average 
Progressive 
Index 
* 3.29 
2. 77 
* 2.54 
1. 94 
*Differences statistically significant at the .10 level. 
Similar conclusions emerge from analysis of means of acquisition by 
progressive farmers and others (see Table 7). In l1asaka, it is clear that 
progressive farmers obtaiD land through purchase; 81 percent of all parcels 
held by progressive farmers were acqui!'."ed through purchase. Yet in Masaka it 
seems that the land market is well-developed and the non-progressive 
households also acquired a majority of their parcels (73 percent) by 
purchase. In Luwero, in contrast, progressive farmers are much more active 
in the land market than others: 58 percent of all parcels held by 
progressive farmers were acquired through purchase, versus 37 percent of all 
parcels for non-progressive farmers. 
. -
·- ... -.. .. .......,.._ ,. ···- ' 
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Table 7 
Parcel Acquisition Method by Household Type 
(nurnbe~ of parcels) 
Means of Acquisition Progressive Not Progressive 
LUWERO 
Purchase 29 39 
Inherit or Gift 21 67 
MA SAKA 
Purchase 30 70 
Inherit or Gift 7 26 
*Differences statistically significant at the .10 level. 
Examination of the means by which individual households acquire land 
strengthens the conclusion that the land market is particularly important for 
progressive farmers. In Masaka, of the 18 progressive farmers, 13 or 72 
percent purchased all of their parcels and only one had not purchased any 
parcel. Of the "not progressive" group, 24 (31 percent) had inherited or 
been given all of their land. In Luwero, of 30 progressive farmers, 8 (27 
percent) purchased all of their parcels and 9 (30 percent) had not purchased 
any of the parcels currently farmed. Of the 69 "not progressive" farmers, 
15 (22 percent) had purchased all of their land but 42 (61 p e rcent ) had 
inherited or been gi¥en all of the land they farm. It appears that those 
farmers characterized as "progressive" are more active in the land market 
and, as a group, are more dependent on the market for acquiring land to farm. 
( / Land Tenure and Access. An important issue for land policy is whether 
the land tenure system facilitates transfer of land to those most likely to 
be able to increase its productivity. In the previous section, it was 
established that progressive farmers are generally able to gain access to 
land through purchase. The causal relationship, if any, between the type of 
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land tenure and the land market is less clear. Because the land ~aws in the 
early 1900' s established a market in mailo land one might expect .that land 
under mailo ownership would be most likely to have been acquired through 
purchase, and that land under customary tenure would be least likely to 
transfer through the market. In fact, this hypothesis is supported by the 
Masaka data, but in Luwero the land held by mailo owners is least likely to 
have been purchased while customary tenure land is most likely to have been 
acquired through the land market (see Table 8) . 
Table 8 
Means of Acquisition of Land, by Tenure Type 
(parcel data) 
Percent of 
parcels held in 
LUWERO 
mailo ownership 
mailo tenancy 
customary tenancy 
MA SAKA 
:nailo ovmership 
mailo tenancy 
customary tenancy 
-------------
* Differences statistically 
Acquired through--
Purchase Inheritance/Gift 
* 
31. 3 68.7 
40.9 59.1 
52.7 47.3 
* 
90.6 9.4 
66.7 33.3 
51. 3 48.7 
significant at the .10 level. 
These results are consistent with those on land acquisition by 
progressive farmers. Progressive farmers tend to purchase land. In Luwero 
they hold customary land while in Masaka progressive farmers are more likely 
to own mailo land. In both areas mailo tenants are an intermediate group. 
It is not clea:r= why progressive farmers tend to buy land under customary 
tenure in Luwero and mailo land in Masaka. It is possible that the land 
markets function quite differently in the two areas. It is also possible 
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that the supply of land to the market is influenced by individual 
characteristics not measured in this study which happen to be associ~ted with 
tenure. The data collected in this i-esearch were not sufficient to determine 
whether, or why ,, the land market functions differently with respect to tern1i t 
type in the two survey areas. 
The results suggests that the land tenure rules do allow progressive 
farmers to gain access to land, often through the land market. For mailo 
parcels a land market has functioned for several decades, and previ0us 
research has noted the importance of the market in the rise of commercial 
farming (Hougham, 1973; Richards, 1973). The existence of a land market for 
parcels under customary tenure is less well-documented, but in both Luwero 
and Hakaka it seems that much land, under all forms of tenure, changes hands 
through sale. The land market seems especially important to pro8ressive 
farmers. 
Poverty and Access to Land 
The opposite horn of the land policy dilemma is access to land by those 
members of the society with little wealth or power. In traditional African 
tenure systems access to land for subsistence income was guaranteed by 
descent group membership. Under conditions of increasing land scarcity, 
individualization of tenure rules and the rise of a market in land, it is 
possible that a large class of landless peasants will be created while the 
non-farm economy is unable to absorb the labor forced out of agriculture. In 
Uganda, access to land by both the poor and the urban middle class was a 
critical ingredient in the survival strategy of many households during the 
steep decline of the non-farm economy from 1972-1986. Access to land by the 
poor provides income-earning opportunity in the absence of expansion in the 
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non-farm economy, and provides the poor a measure of economic security i n 
societies without state-operated systems of social insurance. 
Definition of Poverty. PovertyMis typically defined with respect to 
annual household income. Ideally a household's well-being would be computed 
through some combination of its annual income and its accumulated wealth in 
cash, property, or other investments. But in African research the 
measurement of income is extremely difficult and accurate measurement depends 
on careful observation and interviewing over an extended period of time. 
Given the time and resource limits of the study it was not possible to obtain 
a precise measure of household income. Lacking a precise measure, poverty 
status was determined by a series of specific questions on ownership of a 
working radio, bicycle, whether the house wall was block, whether the 
household owned any cattle, and how frequently the household grows enough 
food to feed itself (most/every year versus some/very few years or never). 
In effect a series of proxy variables were used to reflect current income 
(food supply in kind), evidence of past income (bicycle, radio, house walls) 
and accumulated wealth in cattle. Responses indicating higher levels of 
income or wealth were assigned a value of one, the other assigned zero. A 
"poverty index" was 'Constructed by summing the assigned values. The 
resulting index ranged from zero (extremely poor) to five (not poor). For 
part of the analysis the sample was divided into a group of "poor" households 
with a poverty index less than or equal to two, and a group of "not poor" 
households with a poverty index greater than or equal to three. 
Characteristics of Povertv. The group classified as "poor" had 
different characteristics in Luwero and Masaka. In Luwero there is no 
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difference in average landholding by poor versus not-poor households. Poor 
households are older, have a lower proportion of land in coffee, have fewer 
parcels, but control as much laud as' the non-poor. In Masaka the poor are 
not significantly older than the non-poor but have, on average, one-half as 
many parcels, about one third as much land and about one-third as much coffee 
acreage. In both Luwero and Masaka the poor have a lower progressivity index 
than the non,-poor. 
Characteristic 
Table 9 
Characteristics of Poor Households 
(household data) 
Luwero Mas aka 
Poor .Not Poor Poor Not Poor 
Nuniber of Households 55 57 52 49 
Average coffee yield 5.8 6.5 5.8 8.3 
(bags per acre) 
Proportion of land .12 .21 
* 
.27 .31 
in coffee 
Average acres of coffee .85 1.17 1. 08 3.06 
Number of parcels 1. 8 2.5 
* 
1.1 2.2 
Average total acres 10.2 11.9 4.7 13.0 
Age 59.6 51.4 
* 
55.0 51. 8 
Mean progressivity index 2.33 3.12 
* 
1. 23 2 /,"" • "'T _, 
-----------
*Differ·ences statistically significant at . 10 level . 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Tenure and Access to Land. Poor households are concentrated in the 
mailo owner group in Luwero and in the customary tenancy group in Masaka. 
This distribution exactly parallels the distribution of the progressivity 
index discussed in the previous section. 
Location 
LUWERO 
Poor 
Not Poor 
Mean poverty index 
MAS AKA 
Poor 
Not Poor 
Mean poverty index 
29 
Table 10 
Poverty Status by Tenure Type 
(Numbe~, of Parcels) 
Mailo 
Owner 
56 
24 
2.60 
8 
40 
3.52 
Mailo 
Tenancy 
30 
13 
2.58 
22 
25 
2.51 
*Differences statistically significant at .01 level. 
Customary 
Tenancy 
* 24 
30 
3.33 * 
26 
13 
* 
1. 79 * 
The poor are more likely to gain land through inheritance or gift rather 
than purchase, compared to the not-poor. 
Location 
LUWERO 
purchase 
inherit/gift 
NA SAKA 
purchase 
inherit/gift 
Table 11 
Means of Acquiring Land, 
by Poverty Status of Household 
(Number of Parcels) 
Poor 
33 
77 
33 
23 
Not Poor 
* 
*Differences statistically significant at 
This is consistent with the data on tenure status and progressivity index 
presented above. It is also not surprising that the non-poor purchase land 
more frequently than the poor, since purchase requires relatively large 
amounts of savings 9r annual income. However, even the poor purchase, a 
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majority of their parcels in Masaka, acquiring 59 percent of their parcels 
through the market. 
One indicator of whether the poor have enough land to meet thei r needs 
is the percentage o f households looking for land.~/ In general t h e poor ar e 
less active in looking for land than the non- poor (see Table 12). 
Nevertheless, over one-half of the poor households are looking for land , 
which suggests the possibility that a substantial number of households may 
not be able to meet minimum needs. In Masaka, 24 of 56 poor hous eholds ( 43 
percent) were looking for more land to farm. Those poor households looking 
fo~ more land have lower mean age of head (47.4 years versus 60 . 0 years) and 
more parcels (1.14 versus 1.03) although the difference in parcels is no t 
statistically significant (see Table' 13). No female-headed poor h ouseholds 
(of 7) were looking for more land, even though this gro~p had a l ow average 
age (46.6 years) . It is likely that some of the poor are eiderly pe op l e who 
do not wish to increase their farm activity, but the clear implication is 
that a group of non-elderly, male-headed, poor households may not b e able to 
obtain access to more land to farm in the Masaka area. 
Location 
LUWERO 
poor 
not poor 
MA SAKA 
poor 
not poor 
- - - - --. - - - - -- - - - -
Table 12 
Percent of Households Looking for Land , 
by Poverty Status 
Looking Not Looking 
(percent) 
* 
50.9 49.1 
72. 3 27.7 
"'k 
42.9 57 . 1 
64.1 35.9 
* ' Differences statistically significant at . 10 level . 
\ 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In both study sites, Luwero and"' Masaka, both the customary and the mailo 
land tenure systems have adapted to changing conditions in providing access 
to land for botn progressive farmers and the poor. In Luwero, progressive 
farmers typically acquire more land through purchase of parcels with 
customary tenure. In Masaka, progressive farmers expand their operation by 
becoming mailo owners through land purchase. The poor have access to land in 
both Luwero and Masaka although holding size for the poor in Masaka is quite 
small, and the study design does not provide evidence on the extent to which 
a landless class already exists in either location. 
The land tenure system in both locations proved flexible enough to allow 
the develop;nent of a strong mar-Y.et for both mailo and customary tenure lar.ds. 
~nong progressive farmers, in Masaka 81 percent of all parcels were acquired 
through purchase; in Luwero 58 percent. Among the poor, the market was also 
a major means of acquiring land: in Masaka, 58.9 percent of the parcels held 
by poor households were acquired through purchase, and in Luwero 30 percent. 
Yet precisely because the flexibility in land access results from a 
market in both mailo· and customary land, any dramatic changes in the land 
market may greatly change the extent of access to land by both progressive 
and poor farmers. Access to land by both groups is dependent on the price of 
land, which in turn is a function of land supply and demand. The danger is 
that higher land prices will exclude those with little initial capital from 
access to the land needed to begin farming, or prevent those who can use la~d 
most productively from accumulating enough capital to expand their 
Characteristic 
Number of Households 
Average Age 
Number of Parcels 
Female-headed (%) ' 
Male-headed (%) 
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Table 13 
Characteristics of Poor Households 
Looking and NQt Looking for Land 
(household data) 
Luwero 
Look Not Look 
25 30 
55.2 59.9 
1.48 1.47 
29.4 70.6 
51. 6 48.4 
:•!as aka 
Look Not Look 
21 
47.4 
1.14 
0 
49.0 
31 
60.0 * 
1. 03 
100 
51.0 * 
*Differences statistically significant at the .10 level 
In Luwero the poor seem less constrained in obtaining access to land . 
First, fewer poor than non-poor are looking for more land, as in Hasaka . But 
the group of poor households looking for land is not significantly different 
from those who are not looking, in terms of average age or number of parcels. 
Like Makasa, female-headed households are much less likely to be looking for 
more land than male-headed households. In both Luwero and Masaka the poor 
have less land than those not poor, but the difference between the groups is 
small in Luwero and large in Masaka. In Masaka where the poor are 
concentrated among customary holders, the average size of holding for those 
households with only customary tenure land was 2.6 acres. The ability of t:he 
household to meet its food and cash needs from such a small holding must be 
questioned. Given the amount of subdivision that would normally occur at 
transfer of parcels to the next generation, it is likely that these 
households will not be able to continue to meet subsistence needs without 
substantial outmigration of labor from the area. 
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operations. Dramatic increases in the real price of land can result from 
either supply or demand factors in the market. 
If A rapid increase in the demand >for land might result from either 
increased population pressure or from political or economic instability. 
Uganda has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, estimated 
at over 3 percent per year. Some of the empirical differences between Masaka 
and Luwero can be partly explained by differences in population pressure on 
the land. In 1980, population per square kilometer of cultivable land was 
estimated at 52 in Luwero and 114 in Masaka (Kisamba-Mugerwa, et al., 1989). 
Parcel size is generally smaller in Masaka--45 percent of all parcels are 
under 4 acres versus only 21 percent of all parcels in Luwero. Land prices 
are also higher in Masako.. Although the land market is erratic , price 
depends on land quality, and farmers' estimates may contain a great element 
of personal judgement, both the sample survey and informal conservation with 
farmers revealed estimated land prices for a "typical" acre in Luwero at Sh 
5000-9000, while in Masaka estimates were in the range of Sh 50,000 (Uganda 
shillings, Sh 145 US$ 1). In Masaka the pervasiveness of the land market, 
the high price of land, and the small holding size of poor households 
suggests that the next generation will have difficulty in establishing 
farming households out of the family's current holdings, especially on 
customary land, and may have difficulty amassing t · needed to 
~--- - .... . . 
~S1\i \.li~ GF :C:ii-~}t.',.. ., 
purchase enough land to provide for food se ~~~~Tency-.- - : ~. ' ... ·, ·~\ ~*';,;--· · .. . 
(! A second source of dramatic increase ~~e p l(i Q'e. 5f. land mf'gh" arise 
from political or economic instability that~~-a.§~ . i~1dividua~s- to ·purchase 
'..::~.;:, ~· ' . • J 
land to protect against rapid inflation, avoid the risk inher'ent in fixed-
place investment in urban areas, avoid the risk of economic instability of 
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large businesses subject to government influence, or a myriad of other 
motives. Any increase in the profitability of agriculture relative to other 
forms of investment would also stimulate non-farm investors to purchase rural 
land, but income in the farming sector would also rise so the increased 
purchasing power of farm households would at least partly offset the land 
price increase. 
A countervailing influence is the rate of growth in the non-farm sector 
of the economy. To the extent that non-farm economic development draws labor 
from the agricultural sector and provides non-agricultural investment 
opportunities, the demand for land will be less than otherwise. 
Urban/industrial economic growth and political stability would also make 
investment in farmland less attractive than otherwise. The future rate of 
growth in the non-farm economy depends partly on future political stability, 
government policy to stimulate the non-farm economy, and conditions in world 
commodity and financial markets. 
The supply of land will also influence future prices. Unoccupied land 
is rare (or perhaps non-existent) in the two survey areas. Reliable data on 
the percent of arable land uncultivated are not available. From the sample 
s·urvey, a reasonable· ~stimate is that about 15 percent of the cultivable land 
in the Masaka area is not used, and the percentage is somewhat higher in 
Luwero. Yet this land may not be available to the market because it may be 
in fallow to restore fertility or simply unused because the household lacks 
the labor in that particular year. Government policy could assist in 
increasing land supply by imposing a land tax which would increase the cost 
of holding large parcels of land by households lacking the labor to engage in 
high-value but labor-using farming practices and cropping patterns. 
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Government policy can also increase the effective supply of land thro:ugh 
,':r 
research and extension services that increase land productivity , such a s 
through development and introduction ''of high-yielding varieties of food or 
cash crops. 
(/ Changes in the rnaj or forces affecting land prices will greatly influence 
the ability of both progressive and poor farmers to gain access to land in 
the corning decades. In the meanwhile, the land tenure system will determine 
who has access to. land under what conditions. Given the critical importance 
of the land market to both progressive and poor farmers, land law must e i ther 
support the functioning of the land market or government must devise another 
means of allocating land to households. The current land law embodied in the 
Land Reform Decree exposes mailo tenants and customary hold ers to loss of 
land through tbe granting of leases to tho~;e able to manipulate the 
governmental bureaucratic system . Mailo owners risk loss of flexibility in 
land use through imposition of development conditions . If implemented and 
enforced the Decree could have a major negative impact on both poor and 
progressive farmers, through the land market. A functioning market depends 
on agreement among participants that the rights transferred through exchange 
wlll be socially sanctioned. Enforcement of the Decree could undercut the 
land market by removing the certainty that the use and exchange rights 
transferred will in fact belong to the purchaser. Most of those interviewed 
were unaware of the potential impact of the Decree, so it has probably not 
affected the market greatly . 
An appropriate role for government policy is to support the ev olution of 
these tenure systems and avoid disrupting the normal process of land 
allocation. For example, government policy might recognize the reality that, 
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for several decades, rnailo owners have had virtual freehold rights in the 
land they farm. Likewise, the rnailo tenant has come to have essentially 
freehold rights in his land. One tehure reform option is to recog~ize the 
existing state of these rights and give freehold title to both rnailo owners 
and rnailo tenants, on land they farm, confirming the existing state of 
evolution in land tenure practice. The land law might also recognize that, 
in places like Masaka and Luwero, customary tenure has evolved to closely 
resemble mailo (and freehold), so government might provide for a system to 
convert customary tenancy to freehold at the land user's request, or when 
land is transferred through sale to unrelated individuals. 
In general, policy might encourage the evolution of land tenure and land 
use by formally recognizing arrangements developed over many decades as 
· people adjusted customary tenure and the imposed mailo system to the demands 
and opportunities of an open market economy. Cau':ious refo:::-m that builds on 
the proven flexibility and success of the existing land tenure system is 
preferable to more drastic changes with less predictable consequences. 
Government officials and academics should be cautious in overturning a system 
that has met the challenge of the land policy dilenuna . 
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Endnotes 
1/ Even though neoclassical theory allows for differences in individual 
ability, and in fact many conciusions of theory are predicated '!Jn this 
differentiation, much economic research assumes that all peasant 
households are identical and that differences in output among households 
arise only because of different resource endowments. The model employed 
in this research is similar to that employed in the innovation adoption 
research, that change in the agricultural sector is caused by adoption 
of new practices, crops or syster.is by a few farmers seeking advantage in 
the economic or social system in which they operate. In neoclassical 
terms, these are the farmers with highest marginal productivity cf land . . 
2-/ Scarcity may be produced by relatively greater change in populat i on than 
in land area and technology, or by increasing demand for land to take 
advantage of new market opportunities, or combinations. 
2/ Innovators are not necessarily those able to use land most productively. 
Recommended practices might not be equally suited for adoption in all 
locations or on all farm parcels. Some recommended practices may be 
specific to particular crops and therefore eliminate farmers with 
aiterriat.:ive croppin8 patterns. In short, use of the term "progressive" 
does not necessarily mean - that the fa:::-mer produces more, has higher 
skills, or can use land most productively; by definition, it ~imply 
:neans farmer adoption of certain practices. Whether the group of 
farmers defined as "progressive" differs from others in farm or 
household characteristics is an empirical question. 
The index of "progressivity" is based on recommended practices that 
do not require lc.rge aJ:J.ounts of capital or labor. Inevitably, most 
farming practice requires some capital or labor, but the criteria fo:::-
identifying progressive farmers should not be skewed to include only 
those with large capital or labor endowments. Progressive farmers may 
well use more capital or labor in their operations, but the proxy 
variables were chosen to make identification of progressive farmers 
independent of capital or labor endowments of the households. 
See Anthony, et al., p. 156 for a discussion of the difficulty of 
using proxy variables to identify "progres-sive" farmers. 
!±./ The question asked was "Are you looking for more land to farm?" The 
response does not measure effective demand, i.e. demand backed by the 
ability to purchase. The data also exclude the "discouraged seeker," 
the individual who wants more land but is not looking because he lack 
the means to acquire land even if available. 
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